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Susan Turner, Ph.D.* 
 
This paper will discuss recent California policies designed, in large 
part, to reduce the large numbers of persons incarcerated in state prison. 
The most common policies are based on the nature of the offender’s offense 
rather than offender’s risk. This paper will further discuss a number of 
recent policies based on both approaches, describe their impact on 
incarceration rates and crime and discuss how well they are received by 
system actors and the observers of the policies. 
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 Much has been written recently about mass incarceration in the United States, 
including the causes and consequences for those under its supervision, as well as 
their families and communities.1 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the United States 
set out on a path of incarceration that resulted in one in one hundred adults behind 
bars.2 In 2009, at the height of the US prison population, over 1.6 million prisoners 
were under the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities.3 The tide has 
begun to change somewhat. From 2009 to 2014, the total prison population has 
declined by over 500,000.4 Some of this may be due to recent difficult financial 
times as many states tightened their belts as a result of the great recession. States 
have tried a number of policy options recently to reduce the use of incarceration.5 
A recent study of prison closings reported that between 2007–2008 and 2012–2013, 
states experienced a loss of over 19,000 beds with the closing of 148 facilities.6 
California plays a particularly large role in the nation’s prison population, accounting 
for approximately 10% of the overall state prison population.7 This article uses 
California as a case example of the different approaches used to address crowding, 
focusing on considerations of conviction offense and offender risk in different 
policy decisions the state has made.8 This article takes advantage of the unique 
position that the University of California, Irvine (UCI) Center for Evidence-Based 
Corrections has had in the implementation and evaluation of risk-based policies 
within the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. 
 
1. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES ( Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 2014), for an extensive 
analysis of the increase in incarceration in the United States. This edited volume contains chapters by 
experts on a number of topics ranging from crime rates, experiences of incarceration, consequences for 
health and mental health, families and communities, etc. 
2. PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 2008 (2008). 
3. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, NCJ 248955, 
PRISONERS IN 2014 (2015). 
4. Id. 
5. PEW CHARITABLE TRS., 31 STATES REFORM CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICIES THROUGH 
JUSTICE REINVESTMENT (2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2016/12/33_states_ 
reform_criminal_justice_policies_through_justice_reinvestment.pdf [https://perma.cc/L3AG-V8XC]. 
6. Susan Turner et al., A National Picture of Prison Downsizing Strategies, 10 VICTIMS AND 
OFFENDERS 355, 401 (2015). 
7. Id. 
8. This paper focuses on the more “public” changes that have been made to reduce the prison 
population. There are many other administrative changes to the institutional population that CDCR has 
made (e.g., credits). 
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I. BACKGROUND OF CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS 
A. Traditional Sentencing is Offense Based 
California has undergone major changes related to its prison system over the 
past several decades, many of them related to sentencing policy changes.9 During 
the first part of the twentieth century, California, as many other states, utilized 
indeterminate sentencing for criminal offenses.10 Indeterminate sentencing is based 
on the premise that offenders can be rehabilitated and reflected the more 
progressive attitudes of the time. Under indeterminate sentencing structures, 
sanctions for offenses carry a potential range of time to spend in prison. Judges 
sentence an offender to a range of prison time (often with a minimum required) and 
it is up to a parole board to determine whether an offender is ready for release back 
into the community.11 In this sentencing model, the parole board wields the most 
power.12 In 1977, California moved away from indeterminate sentencing except for 
the most serious offenses and adopted determinate sentencing legislation, which set 
specific terms for offenses.13 A base term, with low, medium and upper sentence 
length options were established for all felonies (except those that could receive the 
death penalty of life in prison). Enhancements for specific conduct, such as carrying 
a weapon or bodily injury, can add to the time imposed. Determinate sentencing 
became popular in the late 1970s during a time of great concern about equity and 
fairness in sentencing and a belief that more standardized sentences could help 
remedy these issues.14 What is most instructive for this paper is that with 
determinate sentencing, sentence length and time spent in prison is overwhelmingly 
determined by the offense itself, rather than other factors about the inmate (such as 
participation in treatment, behavior in prison, risk to the community once released, 
etc.). 
Starting about the time determinate sentencing legislation was adopted, 
California, along with other states started experiencing rapid increases in their 
prison populations. These increases were the result of America’s “get tough on 
crime” appetite incorporating a number of criminal justice policies that contributed 
to the massive growth in incarceration: mandatory minimum laws; harsher penalties 
 
9. Petersilia notes that the California Legislature enacted over 1,000 crime bills between 1984 
and 1991. See JOAN PETERSILIA, UNDERSTANDING CALIFORNIA CORRECTIONS: SUMMARY (2006). 
10. Phillip E. Johnson & Sheldon L. Messinger, California’s Determinate Sentencing Statute: 
History and Issues, 1 DETERMINATE SENT’G 13 (1978). 
11. Id. 
12. See Kevin R. Reitz, The Traditional Indeterminate Sentencing Model, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS 270 ( Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
13. See Johnson & Messinger, supra note 10 (noting determinate sentencing was ushered in under 
the Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976). 
14. BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF 
STRUCTURED SENTENCING (2002). 
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for drug offenses; longer sentences for violent offenses; and high failure rates for 
persons on parole.15 
By 2006, California’s prison population had topped 171,000, the largest in the 
nation and one characterized by conditions that were unsafe for staff and inmates.16 
“Churning” parole failures were a large component of the population increase—
more than two-thirds of parolees failed either due to violations or new arrests and 
were returned to prison, often for very short time periods.17 In October 2006, then 
Governor Schwarzenegger proclaimed that “immediate action is necessary to 
prevent death and harm caused by California’s severe prison overcrowding” and 
authorized the transfer of tens of thousands of California inmates to out-of-state 
facilities.18 Actions over the succeeding 10 years can be seen as various attempts to 
trim California’s heavy use of incarceration at the state level. 
B. California’s Expert Panel Report 
In 2007, the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) 
assembled an expert panel of practitioners and researchers to complete an 
assessment of California’s rehabilitation programming for adults.19 This panel was 
also tasked with providing recommendations to improve the rehabilitative 
programming in the department.20 At first glance, this may appear to be unrelated 
to population pressures; however, rehabilitation programming is designed to 
improve the odds that released offenders will succeed in the community and to 
reduce the chances they return to prison.21 For this reason, rehabilitation is an 
important leverage option, although perhaps not as direct as other mechanism—
such as changes to admissions policies—to reduce prison populations. 
 
 
15. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 1; see also Michael Tonry, Sentencing in America: 
1975–2025, 42 CRIME AND JUSTICE 141 (2013). 
16. See Monthly Total Population Report Archive, CAL. DEP’T CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION,  https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_ 
Branch/Monthly/Monthly_Tpop1a_Archive.html [https://web.archive.org/web/20171219032307/ 
https://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Reports_Research/Offender_Information_Services_Branch/Monthly/Monthly_
Tpop1a_Archive.html] (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
17. EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER & RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, 
CAL. DEPT. OF CORR. & REHAB., REPORT TO THE CALIFORNIA STATE LEGISLATURE: A ROADMAP 
FOR EFFECTIVE OFFENDER PROGRAMMING IN CALIFORNIA (2007). 
18. Prison Overcrowding State of Emergency Proclamation, OFF. GOVERNOR EDMUND  
G. BROWN JR., https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278 [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20171223060307/https://www.gov.ca.gov/news.php?id=4278] ( last visited Dec. 23, 2017). 
19. See EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER & RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, 
supra note 16. 
20. Id. 
21. It is also instructive that in 2005, the California Department of Corrections added the word 
“Rehabilitation” to its name. See OPEC Staff, A Decade Ago, a New Name Affirmed Mission of CDCR, 
INSIDE CDCR (Aug. 28, 2015), http://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/2015/08/a-decade-ago-a-new-name-
affirmed-mission-of-cdcr/ [https://perma.cc/9TF4-KVA3], for the CDCR news announcement on 
its name change. 
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The Expert Panel Report concluded with a series of recommendations, 
including: 
 reduce overcrowding; 
 enact legislation to improve use of incentives for programming and 
positive offender behavior; 
 select and utilize a risk assessment tool to assess risk of reoffending; 
 determine rehabilitation programming based on criminogenic and 
other needs; 
 use case plans to monitor offender performance; 
 deliver a core set of programs that cover six specified areas; 
 develop a measurement system for process and outcome measures; 
 develop and strengthen formal relationships with community groups 
ensure parole and community programs target needs of moderate and 
high-risk offenders; assist returning offenders with housing, 
substance abuse, employment and reduce community risk factors; 
 develop the community as a protective factor for returning offenders; 
and 
 develop structured guidelines to respond to technical violations based 
on offender risk and seriousness of the violation.22 
In addition to the list of recommendations, the Expert Panel Report 
developed the California Logic Model, an eight-stage graphic representation of the 
process for assessing offenders for risk and criminogenic needs, delivering 
programs, measuring success, prepping offenders for reentry, providing 
reintegrative services, and follow-up.23 The initial step of the model requires 
offender risk assessment as a first step to determine provision of rehabilitation 
programming. In the logic model, programming is targeted for the moderate and 
higher risk offender, with the low-risk offender removed from participation. 
Limiting correctional programming to higher risk offenders, while counterintuitive 
to some, is derived from research on effective programming principles.24 Since the 
1990s, a number of researchers have been examining factors of successful 
rehabilitative programming.25 One of the key findings is that programs are most 
effective with higher risk offenders (at least in terms of recidivism reduction).26 
Providing rehabilitative programming to lower risk offenders has been shown to be 
counter-productive—often increasing recidivism.27 The California Logic Model has 
 
22. See EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, 
supra note 16, at viii–xiv. 
23. Id. at 20. 
24. Id. 
25. DON A. ANDREWS & JAMES BONTA, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT (5th  
ed. 2010); see also Don A. Andrews et al., Does Correctional Treatment Work? A Clinically Relevant and 
Psychologically Informed Meta-Analysis, 28 CRIMINOLOGY 369 (1990). 
26. ANDREWS & BONTA, supra note 25. 
27. Id. 
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remained a benchmark for measuring progress in rehabilitation efforts by the 
CDCR since it was introduced. In its yearly report, the California Rehabilitation 
Oversight Board considers progress in each of the domains.28 
C. Policy Options 2006 to 2011 to Affect California’s Prison Population 
Between the Governor’s proclamation in 2006 and 2011, California attempted 
a number of measures to reduce its prison population. Population levers may be 
divided (grossly) into three kinds of efforts—those at the “front end” of the system, 
those at the “back end,” and those affecting the prison population. For example, 
“front end” policy options include changing the types of offenses or offenders who 
receive a prison sentence. “Back end” changes can be achieved by changing how 
parole violators are handled. Changes to the institutional population can include 
changes in the use of good or gain time earned, sentence length, parole release 
changes, transferring inmates out of state, etc. 
For the first few years after the 2006 Governor’s proclamation, several options 
were tried that collectively did not reduce the prison population greatly. Assembly 
Bill 900, known as the “Public Safety and Offender Rehabilitation Services  
Act of 2007,” contained language to add over 50,000 beds, using a combination of 
out-of-state transfers, medical beds, beds in existing and secure reentry facilities as 
well as county jails.29 Fifty million dollars was targeted for rehabilitative initiatives 
for CDCR to expand academic substance abuse and other services.30 A California 
Legislative Analyst report two years later noted that the additional beds were slow 
to be added due difficulties in citing some of the reentry facilities in local 
communities, as well as slow starts in the CDCR’s own infill construction projects 
at existing facilities.31 
In 2009, California Senate Bill 678, “The California Community Corrections 
Performance Incentives Act of 2009,” provided county incentives to reduce the use 
of prison as a sanction for probation violators, and thus help reduce the state prison 
population. Under this bill, local county community corrections partnerships  
were to be established, headed by the Chief Probation Officer in each county to 
support evidence-based probation supervision practices.32 Estimates show that 
 
28. See California Rehabilitation Oversight Board (C-ROB), OFF. INSPECTOR GEN.,  
http://www.oig.ca.gov/pages/c-rob.php# [https://perma.cc/NN2M-EWWT]  ( last visited Feb. 9, 
2018), for semiannual and annual reports prepared by C-ROB. 
29. See NANCY PAULUS, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT: 
IMPLEMENTING AB 900’S PRISON CONSTRUCTION AND REHABILITATION INITIATIVES 1 (2009), 
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2009/crim/ab900/ab900_051409.pdf [https://perma.cc/F9X9-6G2M]. 
30. Id. 
31. See MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, A STATUS REPORT: REDUCING 
PRISON OVERCROWDING IN CALIFORNIA 5–6 (2011), http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/2011/crim/
overcrowding_080511.pdf [https://perma.cc/AB6M-D24G]. 
32. See CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB678 YEAR 1 REPORT: IMPLEMENTATION OF 
THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVE ACT (2011), 
www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-1-Report-FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/CPK2-EE9B]. 
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approximately 6,000 offenders were diverted from prison in the first year; 9,500 in 
the second year.33 
Subsequent to this, in 2010, Senate Bill x3-18 contained a laundry list of policy 
options, reflecting all three mechanisms discussed above to reduce populations 
(although some not stated explicitly), including: 
 earned credits in prison and jail; 
 non-revocable parole; 
 changing felony property crime limits; 
 probation revocation reduction incentives; 
 reentry courts; and 
 parole violation decision making instrument. 
The expectation was that the prison population would be reduced by about 
6,500 over the course of a year.34 Earned credits reflect a rehabilitative focus toward 
reductions in sentence length. Legislation allowed offenders to earn up to six weeks 
per year off their sentence for completion of certain rehabilitative programs.35 The 
effort to change property limits foreshadowed Proposition 47, which was passed in 
2014. Under SB x3-18, some grand theft felony crimes’ monetary limits were 
increased to $950 from $400, but the monetary limits for basic grant theft were not 
changed.36 Reentry courts, which provided highly-structured treatment for parolees, 
were to be used as an alternative to returning parolees to prison.37 These types of 
“specialty” courts have been popular since the 1980s, with the introduction of drug 
courts.38 In these courts, participants generally have a much more “hands-on” 
experience, with more direct contact with the court ( judge) and a focus on 
rehabilitation as opposed to punishment.39 I discuss in greater detail below the 
implementation of non-revocable parole (NRP) as well as the parole violation 
decision making instrument—two policies that considered, perhaps for the first 
time, offender risk in changes that would affect prison population crowding. 
However, with all these legislative changes, one might categorize them as a modest 
 
33. Id.; see also CAL. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE COURTS, SB 678 YEAR 2 REPORT: 
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CALIFORNIA COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS PERFORMANCE INCENTIVES 
ACT OF 2009 (2012), www.courts.ca.gov/documents/SB678-Year-2-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
H5WX-GVTG]. 
34. See OPEC Staff, CDCR Implements Public Safety Reforms to Parole Supervision, Expanded 
Incentive Credits for Inmates, INSIDE CDCR ( Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.insidecdcr.ca.gov/ 
2010/01/cdcr-implements-public-safety-reforms-to-parole-supervision-expanded-incentive-credits-
for-inmates/ [https://perma.cc/PH9J-FFAC]. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 14 (2009); see also Shannon M. Carey, Juliette R. Mackin & Michael  
W. Finigan, What Works? The Ten Key Components of Dug Court: Research-Based Best Practices, VIII 
DRUG CT. REV. 6, 24, 33 (2012) (citing participant exposure to the judge, sparing use of jail as a 
sanction, and habilitation services as three best practices in drug courts for positive outcomes). 
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package. However, from mid-summer 2006 to mid-summer of 2011, CDCR’s 
prison population had dropped from 171,000 to 152,000.40 
II. HOW CALIFORNIA INCORPORATED “RISK” INTO DECISION MAKING 
A. Development of the California Static Risk Assessment (CSRA) Tool 
It was also during these years, 2006 to 2011, that the CDCR began to 
incorporate the concept of offender risk in decision making at an agency-wide level. 
As noted earlier, the 2007 Expert Panel Report recommended as the first step of 
the California Logic Model, offenders were to receive a risk assessment.41 Prior to 
the Expert Panel Report, the CDCR had adopted the Correctional Offender 
Management Profiling for Alternative Sanctions (COMPAS) in 2005 for parole, but 
it has not been adopted departmentwide. The COMPAS tool has a number of 
scales, including risk scales to predict the likelihood of four different measures of 
recidivism (violence, recidivism, flight, and non-compliance).42 In addition, the 
COMPAS contained “needs” scales measuring 18 different areas (e.g., criminal 
peers, family criminality, residential instability, social isolation).43 The COMPAS is 
administered individually to offenders, gathering information from self-report and 
official records to create a profile of an inmate’s risk and needs.44 
In late 2007, CDCR discussions centered on adopting a tool that would focus 
specifically on offender risk as a “plug in” or replacement for the risk scales used in 
the COMPAS tool to ensure that risk of recidivism could be calculated for all CDCR 
offenders—both inmates and parolees. The Washington State Institute for Public 
Policy’s (WSIPP) static risk tool was chosen as a model for California.45 This tool 
was selected for several reasons. First, it contains only static measures. At the time, 
 
40. An additional 9,600 inmates were out-of-state, per Gov. Schwarzenegger’s Declaration. 
41. EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER & RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, 
supra note 17, at 21. 
42. Id. at 22. 
43. JEFFREY LIN, CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CORR., PAROLEE NEEDS IN CALIFORNIA: A 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF 2006 COMPAS DATA 4–5 (2007), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/
files/2013/06/Parolee-Needs-in-California-A-Descriptive-Analysis-of-2006-COMPAS-Data.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PL9L-YMG7] (noting that evaluations of the COMPAS tool in California have 
been mixed; a 2007 evaluation on the psychometric properties of the COMPAS by Skeem and Louden 
found limitations in interrater reliability, predictive utility and construct validity); see also JENNIFER  
L. SKEEM & JENNIFER ENO LOUDEN, CTR. FOR PUB. POLICY RESEARCH, ASSESSMENT OF 
EVIDENCE ON THE QUALITY OF THE CORRECTIONAL OFFENDER MANAGEMENT PROFILING  
FOR ALTERNATIVE SANCTIONS (COMPAS) 28 (2007), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.732.5843&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/8M68-573C]. 
44. EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER & RECIDIVISM REDUCTION PROGRAMMING, 
supra note 17, at 22 (explaining what COMPAS is in the context of a recommendation that addresses 
the internal causes of California’s rehabilitation programming problems). 
45. ROBERT BARNOSKI & ELIZABETH DRAKE, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, 
WASHINGTON’S OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY ACT: DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS’ STATIC RISK 
INSTRUMENT 1 (2008) http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/977/Wsipp_Washingtons-Offender-
Accountability-Act-Department-of-Corrections-Static-Risk-Instrument_Full-Report-Updated-October-
2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/77XA-UAGB]. 
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data systems utilized by CRCR did not record dynamic factors for all offenders, thus 
it was not possible for CDCR to include such factors as educational attainment or 
substance abuse, which are often included in risk scales.46 In addition, CDCR 
officials determined that the California offender population was similar to the 
Washington Department of Corrections offender population and that a tool 
developed on Washington offenders should result in a valid instrument for the 
California system. 
This tool had the advantages of being automated, and thus reliably calculated, 
and as accurate as other more time intensive risk assessment tools available.47 The 
risk tool consisted of twenty-six items, including offender gender, age, four juvenile 
criminal history items and twenty from an offender’s adult criminal history. 
Although generally viewed as less “advanced” than risk tools that use both static 
and dynamic factors, researchers in Washington State had found that the static tool 
performed as well as the LSI-R, a tool that included both static and dynamic 
factors.48 The actual development of the tool was done by the UCI Center for 
Evidence-Based Corrections, in collaboration with the Office of Research at the 
CDCR. The tool was created in a very short time period. Work began in fall 2007 
and the initial tool was completed by early 2008. 
The CDCR tool, named the California Static Risk Assessment, utilizes 
automated criminal history records from the California Department of Justice. 
Conceptually, the tool counts prior convictions in the same adult twenty felony and 
misdemeanor categories as did the Washington State tool (e.g., murder/
manslaughter, property, drug) in an offender’s criminal history, weighs the counts 
to produce a score on each of three subscales defined as: (1) violent felony;  
(2) property violent; and (3) any felony which is used to predict conviction during 
three years after release to the community.49 During development, the CDCR 
determined that conviction would be the most appropriate recidivism measure to 
consider.50 Offenders are then assigned to one of five risk levels depending upon 
their scores on the three subscales using a hierarchical process. Those offenders 
with the highest violence subscale scores are considered “high-risk-violent.” For the 
 
46. PAMELA M. CASEY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, OFFENDER RISK &  
NEEDS ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS: A PRIMER FOR COURTS (2014), http://www.ncsc.org/~/
media/microsites/files/csi/bja%20rna%20final%20report_combined%20files%208-22-14.ashx 
[https://perma.cc/C9PM-7UEX]. 
47. Id. at A-61. 
48. Id. at A-59. 
49. Id. at A-61 through 62. 
50. There is no universally accepted measure of recidivism. Recently California’s Board of State 
and Community Corrections was tasked with developing a standardized measure of recidivism for the 
state. The effort was led by the California Bureau of State and Community Corrections (BSCC), which 
consulted with a number of justice system stakeholders. The group finally voted 8 to 2 in favor of a 
single definition based on convictions over a three-year period, but hedged their recommendations 
with the addition of supplemental measures. See Press Release, Cal. Bd. of State & Cmty. Corr., BSCC 
Committee Releases Recidivism Definition (Sept. 25, 1998), http://www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/
Recidivism%20Defintion%20Press%20Release.pdf [https://perma.cc/3447-3DYR]. 
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remaining offenders, those with a high property/violent score are classified as 
“high-risk-property.” The remaining three groups—high-risk drugs, moderate and 
low-risk offenders—are then assigned in a sorting process based on their scores on 
the “any felony” subscale.51 Over 100,000 releases from the CDCR in 2002-2003 
were used in developing the tool.52 Using standard practices, the development 
process included a construction and validation phase, in which findings from a 
randomly sampled half of the release cohort are then tested on the second half. The 
tool’s accuracy, as measured by a common metric, “Area Under the Curve,” is in 
line with other instruments in the field, yielding moderately predictive results.53 As 
is the case with prediction instruments, recidivism rates are calculated based on a 
group averages. Thus, recidivism rates may not accurately predict recidivism for a 
particular individual. Some individuals who are predicted to have a high probability 
of recidivism, may in reality not commit crimes (i.e., false positives); some 
individuals predicted to be low-risk end up offending (i.e., false negatives). 
The resulting CSRA instrument automatically calculates risk of recidivism 
scores for approximately 95% of all CDCR offenders using the scoring algorithm 
and criminal history records.54 A manual computation is necessary for offenders 
with all or portions of their criminal histories still in non-automated formats. Figure 
1 shows the risk assessment groups and the risk of recidivism for each of the five 
groups. What is noticeable across the different groups are the high levels of 
recidivism, even for the low-risk group. In other words, even though the group is 
called “low,” it is by no means “no risk.” 
 
51. See id. 
52. See id. 
53. James Hess & Susan Turner, Accuracy of Risk Assessment in Corrections Populations 
Management: Where is the Value Added, in HANDBOOK ON RISK AND NEED ASSESSMENT: THEORY 
AND PRACTICE 93-113 (Faye S. Taxman ed., 2016); SUSAN TURNER ET AL., UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE 
CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED CORR., DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA STATIC RISK ASSESSMENT 
INSTRUMENT (CSRA) (2009), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2009/11/CSRA-Working-
Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/NNK7-WRSB]. 
54. For those offenders with manual rap sheets, this is calculated by hand. 
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Figure 1 
B. Use of Risk in Parole Violation Decision Making Instrument 
As the prison population soared in California, it was obvious that a large part 
of the growth was due to parole revocations to prison. In 2005, approximately two-
thirds of parolees had their parole revoked within three years after release and were 
reincarcerated in CDCR.55 Revocations were used to handle not only what is 
referred to as “technical” violations—those of the terms and conditions that are 
not in themselves criminal behavior, such as failure to report—but also to serve as 
an alternative to courts for processing criminal behavior. In fact, a report to the 
Little Hoover Commission (LHC) by Jeremy Travis indicates that the largest share 
of technical parole violations were for criminal behaviors.56 Several years before, 
another LHC report indicated that prison was being used too frequently as a 
sanction for violators, contrasted with other states which would use drug treatment 
or intermediate sanctions for violations.57 There was also the perception at the time 
that parole agents were not consistent in applying sanctions for parole violations. 
 
55. Ryan Fischer, Are California’s Recidivism Rates Really the Highest in the Nation? It Depends 
on What Measure of Recidivism You Use, 1 BULLETIN 1, 1–2 (2005). 
56. JEREMY TRAVIS, THE URBAN INST., PAROLE IN CALIFORNIA 1980-2000: IMPLICATIONS 
FOR REFORM 9 (2003). 
57. LITTLE HOOVER COMM’N, BACK TO THE COMMUNITY: SAFE AND SOUNDS PAROLE 
POLICIES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xii–xiii (2003). 
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The CDCR engaged in planning processes to implement a parole violation 
decision making instrument, even before it was required by SBx-13, in an attempt 
to reduce the use of prison as a sanction for violations and to encourage more 
consistent applications of responses to violations.58 The use of decision-making 
matrices for parole responses was not new. The Salient Factor Score had been 
created decades earlier for use in parole decision making.59 More recently, the state 
of Ohio implemented a decision-making tool in 2005 and found the initiative 
revealed that the guidelines resulted in significantly-reduced use of revocations and 
revocation hearings and sentences to local jails.60 At its core, the PVDMI combines 
two scales—risk of recidivism (defined by the CSRA risk group) and severity of the 
current violation, along with escalation for sex offenders—for recommended 
responses to violations. During the planning process at the CDCR, the 
implementation team categorized parole violations into one of four categories based 
on seriousness, as defined by the length of time of return to custody for the 
violation. The PVDMI does not tailor the response type to the violation type, for 
example, if a parolee commits a drug violation, and it does not specifically 
recommend drug treatment or a sanction related to drug use. It does, however, 
include a broad menu of options for the Least Intensive (e.g., verbal reprimand, 
behavioral contract) and Moderately Intensive (e.g., increased urinalysis testing, 
referral to a variety of program options) sanctions so that parole agents can choose 
an appropriate sanction within a set of options based on the violation and the 
parolee.61 According to the tool, low-risk parolees with low-severity violations 
would receive the least intrusive responses, while high-risk parolees with high-
severity violations would be sanctioned with a revocation and return to prison.62 
When a parole agent entered a parolee’s name into PVDMI database, an 
offender’s CSRA score would automatically populate on the tool; the recommended 
decision box was then displayed. Officers could “override” or “underride” the 
tool’s recommendation if they cited certain stabilizing (e.g., employment, job 
stability) or destabilizing factors (e.g., chronic pattern of violations under 
supervision, escalating drug or alcohol addiction).63 
 
58. MADELINE M. CARTER & LEILAH GILLIGAN, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CALIFORNIA 
PAROLE VIOLATIONS DECISION MAKING INSTRUMENT (PVDMI): FINAL REPORT (2009); see also 
RYKEN GRATTET ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PAROLE VIOLATIONS AND REVOCATIONS  
IN CALIFORNIA (2008), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/Parole-Violations-and-
Revocations-in-California.pdf [https://perma.cc/LV7J-7KQ7]. 
59. Peter Hoffman & Sheldon Adelberg, The Salient Factor Score: A Nontechnical Overview, 44 
FED. PROB. 44–52 (1980). 
60. BRIAN MARTIN & STEVE VAN DINE, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, EXAMINING THE IMPACT 
OF OHIO’S PROGRESSIVE SANCTION GRID: FINAL REPORT xi (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/grants/224317.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6DV-RT26]. 
61. Susan Turner et al., Evaluation of the California Parole Violation Decision-Making Instrument 
(PVDMI), 35 J. CRIME & JUST. 269, 272 (2012). 
62. Id. 
63. Id. 
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The UCI Center of Evidence-Based Corrections conducted a process and 
outcome evaluation of the pilot test of the PVDMI.64 Of particular interest was how 
well parole agents in the field would begin to use and incorporate the use of an 
actuarial tool in their decision-making, which had historically been based on their 
personal “gut” experiences.65 
Findings from the study were not particularly positive. An examination of 
whether parole agents used the recommended sanctions, based on the offender’s 
risk and severity of behavior, revealed a substantial number of instances in which 
the agents did not follow the tool’s recommended decision. It appeared that agents 
did not follow the tool about a third of the time, often citing a lack of treatment 
options available locally. For example, we found a number of instances in which 
agents chose to revoke a parolee when the tool recommended a less severe sanction. 
When we examined reasons for escalating the tool’s recommended option, the two 
most frequent destabilizing factors that were selected were that the “chronic pattern 
of violations under supervision” and “violation is directly related to either the 
current commitment offense behavior or a pattern of previous criminal behavior.” 
This, despite the fact that the CSRA was precisely developed to summarize the risk 
inherent in the parolee’s criminal record, suggested the agents did not believe the 
tool accurately captured criminal behavior.66 Disappointingly, the tool did not 
appear to reduce the use of revocation as a sanction for parolee misbehavior, 
perhaps the result of the use of underrides and overrides. 
The tool also appeared to garner resistance from agents on other levels. We 
found that agents tried to second guess the tool. Agents report that they had a 
sanction in mind before entering the data into the automated tool. If the tool “did 
not agree” with their feelings about the appropriateness of a sanction, they would 
use stabilizing or destabilizing factors to bring the final recommendation into line 
with their preferred sanction. The resistance from line officers in California is not 
unique. Steiner and colleagues found that parole officers in Ohio expressed 
dissatisfaction with the tool on a number of dimensions, including whether the tool 
assisted in decision making.67 
C. Use of Risk in Non-Revocable Parole 
Another policy change contained in SBx-18 was the use of non-revocable 
parole (NRP). This policy was developed based on the risk, need, and responsivity 
(RNR) literature, which recommends that resources be targeted to the higher risk 
individuals and not those at lower risk of recidivism. In fact, studies have shown 
 
64. Id.; AMY MURPHY & SUSAN TURNER, UNIV. OF CAL. IRVINE CTR. FOR EVIDENCE-BASED 
CORR., PAROLE VIOLATION DECISION-MAKING INSTRUMENT (PVDMI) PROCESS EVALUATION 
(2009), http://ucicorrections.seweb.uci.edu/files/2013/06/PVDMI.pdf [https://perma.cc/372N-
9UR2]. 
65. Turner et al., supra note 61. 
66. See MURPHEY et al., supra note 64. 
67. Benjamin Steiner et al., Understanding Parole Officers’ Responses to Sanctioning Reform, 57 
CRIME & DELINQ. 222 (2011). 
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that intensive resources targeted at the lower risk can result in worse outcomes.68 
Under non-revocable parole, “lower level” offenders would be placed on a form of 
summary parole when released from prison. Non-revocable parolees would not be 
subject to the usual terms and conditions of parole, which often resulted in 
revocations and contributed to the “churning” prison population. They would 
however, be subject to search and seizure, a component of the program that was a 
concession to law enforcements concern that without some kind of “hook,” public 
safety would be compromised. With fewer resources dedicated to the lower level 
parolees, parole would be able to focus more intensive resources on the offenders 
to improve their changes of successful reentry into the community. 
Eligibility for non-revocable parole included the following: 
 No serious offenses; 
 No violent offenses; 
 No violent sex offense or sex offender; 
 No validated prison gang member; 
 No prison disciplinary incidents; 
 Low- or moderate-risk to recidivate; and 
 Parolee did not refuse to sign paperwork for participation.69 
In considering the factors above, risk is only one of a number of factors for 
NRP eligibility. The first four may be described as “high stakes” offenders—those 
serious and violent offenders, as well as sex offenders that the public and policy 
makers consider more serious than, say property or drug offenders. Given the 
restrictive nature of the criteria, it was expected that perhaps 10% of the parole 
population would be eligible.70 
The NRP had a difficult, if short, lifespan. Victims’ rights groups, law 
enforcement and district attorneys were against the policy and the media 
engendered fear in the public. Perhaps one of the most unfortunate aspects of the 
rollout was the flawed implementation that snagged the CSRA risk assessment tool 
in a heated debate and ultimate investigation by the California Inspector General. 
For accurate risk-prediction estimates, the automated scoring protocol for the 
CSRA requires that the offender’s criminal history record be complete. A number 
of the criminal history records used as input to the tool were incomplete due to 
some of old prior record history being stored in manual, as opposed to automated 
records. State staff had not known this was the case. As a result, inmates were 
 
68. Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How 
and Why Correctional Interventions Can Harm Low-risk Offenders, 2004 TOPICS COMMUNITY 
CORRECTIONS 3. 
69. See Division of Adult Parole Operations: Non-Revocable Parole, CAL. DEP’T. CORRECTIONS 
& REHABILITATION, http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/non_revocable_parole/index.html 
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170224074752/http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/parole/non_revocable_ 
parole/index.html] ( last visited Feb. 24, 2017). 
70. Susan Turner, Predicting Risk: Who Knew It Was Such a Risky Business?, in ENVISIONING 
CRIMINOLOGY: RESEARCHERS ON RESEARCH AS A PROCESS OF DISCOVERY 205 (Michael D. Maltz 
& Stephen K. Rice eds., 2015). 
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erroneously determined as eligible and released onto NRP before the CDCR could 
correctly rescore the offenders and return parolees to their proper supervision.71 
Newspaper articles criticized the Department and tool as being “too dangerous,” 
noted crimes committed by these offenders, and sharply criticized the CSRA 
accuracy based on an Inspector General Report that was deeply flawed.72 
One of the most frustrating aspects of the NRP rollout from a researcher’s 
point of view was the apparent misunderstanding about what a risk assessment 
tool—any risk assessment tool—can accomplish. In a meeting with the state 
legislator who called for the Office of the Inspector General (IG) investigation, the 
legislator commented that he was very supportive of risk assessment tools, as long 
as they were 100% accurate.73 Ironically, no evaluation of the actual impact of the 
NRP on public safety was ever completed in order to learn whether the NRP 
summary parole was more harmful to public safety than traditional parole. 
California missed this opportunity to add to current knowledge about parole 
supervision, on which there is no strong evidence that parole supervision has any 
impact on offender outcomes.74 Public Safety Realignment Act (AB 109), enacted 
in October 2011, essentially phased out NRP, as lower level offenders parole 
releases were subject to post-release supervision by local counties. 
III. HOW CALIFORNIA DID NOT INCORPORATE “RISK” INTO DECISION MAKING 
A. Public Safety Realignment (AB 109) 
As California prisons continued to face takeover by the federal government 
for crowded conditions, the state enacted legislation in 2011 (AB 109 and trailer 
bills) collectively known as Public Safety Realignment (“Realignment”). The analysis 
here focuses on how the legislation dealt with the selection of offenders placed 
under the responsibility of local county corrections in an effort to bring the 
California prison population to 137.5% of design capacity.75 
 
71. Id. 
72. See STATE OF CAL. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SPECIAL REPORT: CALIFORNIA 
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION’S IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NON-
REVOCABLE PAROLE PROGRAM (May 2011), https://www.oig.ca.gov/media/reports/ARCHIVE/
BOI/Special%20Report%20California%20Department%20of%20Corrections%20and%20 
Rehabilitations%20Implementation%20of%20the%20Non-Revocable%20Parole%20Program.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/W7Y7-P5JW]. An assessment of the IG report is contained in Turner, supra note 
70. See also Ted W. Lieu, Editorial, California Prisons: ‘Non-Revocable Parole’ is Too Dangerous,  
L.A. TIMES ( June 10, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/10/opinion/la-oe-lieu-nrp-
20110610 [https://perma.cc/8LMQ-6KJE]. 
73. See Turner, supra note 70. 
74. AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URBAN INST., DOES PAROLE WORK? ANALYZING THE IMPACT 
OF POSTPRISON SUPERVISION ON REARREST OUTCOMES (2005), https://www.urban.org/sites/
default/files/publication/51536/311156-Does-Parole-Work-.PDF [https://perma.cc/7TWS-ECL8]. 
75. See Joan Petersilia, Realigning Corrections, California Style, 664 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI. 8, 8–13 (2016), for discussions of the background leading up to Realignment, how the 
legislation is working, and what can be learned from the California experiment. See also Brown v. Plata, 
563 U.S. 493 (2011); CAL. DEP’T OF CORR. & REHAB., FACT SHEET: 2011 PUBLIC  
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AB109 targeted reduction in prison population by targeting both front end 
and back end policy options. Legislation affected the “front end”—prison 
admissions—by requiring that offenders convicted of non-serious, non-violent, and 
non-sex felony offenses with no previous serious and violent priors be handled 
locally. If a prison sentence was imposed, the time would be spent in a local jail, 
rather than state prison. Jail sentences could consist of “jail only,” or the judge could 
impose a split sentence in which a jail term was followed by a term of supervision 
by county probation. The latter were referred to as split sentences; community time 
would be supervised in the community by probation. The law did not prevent the 
traditional option of sentencing offenders to felony probation.76 
The two other large groups targeted by the legislation were “back end.” 
Historically, virtually all California offenders were placed on parole (often three 
years), supervised by the CDCR.77 Under Realignment, offenders whose current 
conviction was for a non-serious, non-violent offenses and sex offenders who were 
not determined to be high-risk by CDCR would no longer be supervised on parole 
after release.78 They would be supervised in the community by local county 
probation under post-release community supervision (PRCS). The third major 
group targeted was parole violators. Recall earlier that a large driver of the increase 
in the California prison population was the “churning” of parole violators in and 
out of prison, serving approximately four months on average, during which little 
programming could take place.79 Under Realignment, parole violators could no 
longer be returned to prison—they were to be handled locally by judges and could 
receive jail terms up to 180 days as a sanction.80 In addition, parolees could be 
subject to a “flash incarceration” of 10 days.81 Virtually every decision made for 
eligibility (with the exception of high-risk sex offender exclusion for PRCS) was 
offense-based. For the front-end sentencing, both prior and current offenses were 
considered. For PRCS, it was only the current offense; offenders could have any 
number of prior serious or violent offenses in their background (we return to this 
point later on). The department’s risk assessment instrument—the CSRA—was not 
utilized in any way. 
Realignment was a massive change in the way California dealt with felony 
offenders. There was a great deal of angst in all sectors about the impact of the 
legislation, including cries that crime rates would escalate, victims’ rights groups 
 
SAFETY REALIGNMENT (2013), www.cdcr.ca.gov/realignment/docs/realignment-fact-sheet.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/SKV7-F4JU] [hereinafter PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET]. 
76. A.B. 109, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011). 
77. See PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FACT SHEET, supra note 75. 
78. In addition, offenders who suffered from mental disorders or who were on parole prior to 
October 1, 2011, were not eligible for PRCS. 
79. See EXPERT PANEL ON ADULT OFFENDER & RECIDIVISM & REDUCTION 
PROGRAMMING, supra note 17. 
80. Initially, parole handled the violations; as of July 1, 2013, the parole revocation process is 
handled by the local courts for all but “lifer” offenders on parole. See PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT 
FACT SHEET, supra note 75. 
81. Id. 
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concern about public safety, and local probation’s need to ramp up supervision 
capacity for the new offenders they were to supervise.82 Local counties were 
provided funding, initially based on projections of the numbers of offenders the 
counties would be responsible for, county population size, and performance under 
SB678 (described earlier), in a performance-based grant program designed to reduce 
probation revocations to prison.83 This funding was designed to allow counties a 
great deal of latitude in how they responded to the increased numbers of offenders; 
counties varied greatly in the extent to which they designed new dollars for jails or 
for services.84 
Although Realignment signaled a massive change in corrections, there was no 
funding dedicated to determining the implementation and impact of Realignment 
statewide. However, individual research organizations, stakeholder groups, and 
counties have helped paint a portrait of how Realignment was implemented and 
how it impacted California corrections. First, the prison population at the CDCR 
declined. Between October 2011 and September 2012, the prison population was 
reduced by over 27,000.85 Crime rates did not increase as a result of Realignment, 
as reflected by an analysis by the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC), 
including property crimes, with the exception of an increase in car theft.86 Jail 
populations, as expected, did rise about 14% in October 2014 relative to before 
Realignment.87 An overall assessment of the state incarceration rate showed that it 
had dropped as a result of Realignment. Stress, however, was placed on local county 
probation departments, who received many more offenders than initially projected. 
The Chief Probation Officers of California indicated that in the first year of 
Realignment, 23,000 more offenders were placed under supervision of the counties 
 
82. See JOAN PETERSILIA, STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CENTER, VOICES FROM THE  
FIELD: HOW CALIFORNIA STAKEHOLDERS VIEW PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT (2014), 
https://law.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/sites/default/files/publication/443439/doc/ 
slspublic/Petersilia%20VOICES%20no%20es%20Final%20022814.pdf [https://perma.cc/JHH5-
ER27], for findings from a study in which stakeholders from criminal justice agencies were interviewed 
regarding the implementation and impact of the Realignment. 
83. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST’S OFFICE, PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT FUNDING 
ALLOCATION (2014), http://www.lao.ca.gov/handouts/crimjust/2014/Public-Safety-Realignment-
051214.pdf [https://perma.cc/63MN-45TA]. 
84. SARA ABARBANEL ET AL., STANFORD CRIMINAL JUSTICE CTR., REALIGNING THE 
REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA COUNTIES’ AB 109 2011-2012 IMPLEMENTATION 
PLANS (2013), https://law.stanford.edu/index.php?webauth-document=child-page/183091/doc/
slspublic/Realigning%20the%20Revolving%20Door%20with%20updates%20for%2058%20counties
090913.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7YY-6B3D]. 
85. See Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Public Safety Realignment: Impacts So Far,  
PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Sept. 2015), http://www.ppic.org/publication/public-safety-realignment-
impacts-so-far/ [https://perma.cc/HV8C-77PY]. 
86. MAGNUS LOFSTRUM & STEVEN RAPHAEL, PUB. POLICY INST. OF CAL., PUBLIC SAFETY 
REALIGNMENT AND CRIME RATES IN CALIFORNIA (2013), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/
report/R_1213MLR.pdf [https://perma.cc/BBL3-5SGV]. 
87. See Magnus Lofstrom & Brandon Martin, Just the FACTS: California’s County Jails,  
PUB. POL’Y INST. CAL. (Nov. 2017), http://www.ppic.org/publication/californias-county-jails/ 
[https://perma.cc/KY7P-CXNG]. 
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as a result of Post Release Community Supervision.88 What was interesting was that 
probation managers indicated that the (supposedly) “lower level” offenders were 
actually higher risk and presented more challenges that they initially anticipated.89 
In 2014, Gerlinger and Turner directly addressed the issue of the risk of these 
“lower level” realigned offenders by examining criminal history backgrounds and 
recidivism of “proxy” parole and PRCS groups using a release cohort of CDCR 
offenders.90 Using prisoners released from the CDCR in 2005 and 2006, the 
research team divided offenders into two groups. Offenders who were convicted of 
a current serious or violent or sex offense, or offenders with mental health 
conditions, were considered proxy-parolees.91 All other offenders were considered 
as proxy-PRCS. The study team found that the “lower level” offenders—the PRCS 
group—had higher re-arrest rates at three years than the proxy-parolees. 
Approximately 80% of the PRCS group had recidivated, compared with 71% of the 
proxy-parolees.92 The backgrounds of the proxy-PRCS groups were actually quite 
serious where only 13% were considered low-risk.93 59% were in the high  
risk-to-recidivate category.94 For the proxy-parole group, over half were in the  
low- and moderate-risk groups as identified by the CSRA.95 Prior records of  
proxy-PRCS were surprising. 11% had prior serious offenses and 11% had prior 
violent offenses.96 The percent of proxy-PRCS offenders with prior violent or 
serious offenses was higher for the proxy-PRCS than the proxy-parole group.97 
Essentially, the “lower level” offenders identified under Realignment were not as 
“low-risk” as one might think. 
B. Proposition 47 Changes Some Drug and Property Felonies to Misdemeanors 
In November 2014, California voters passed Proposition 47, the “Safe 
Neighborhood and Schools Act,” which reduced penalties for certain non-serious 
 
88. Public Safety Realignment – What is It?, REALIGNMENT PERSP. (Chief Prob. Officers of 
Cal., Sacramento, Cal.), Jul. 2012, www.bscc.ca.gov/downloads/cpocbrief11.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
X6CQ-C2SL]. 
89. See Assessing Risks and Needs of Realigned Populations: Post-Release Community Supervision 
and Services, CPOC ISSUE BRIEF (Chief Prob. Officers of Cal., Sacramento, Cal.), Fall 2013,  
https://www.cpoc.org/sites/main/files/file-attachments/issuebrief4_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
5AHF-4BMT]; see also SUSAN TURNER ET AL., PUBLIC SAFETY REALIGNMENT IN TWELVE 
CALIFORNIA COUNTIES (2015), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/
RR800/RR872/RAND_RR872.pdf [https://perma.cc/4B58-DP9A]. 
90. In order not to contaminate expected outcomes of offenders eligible for parole and PRCS 
with their level of community supervision, we chose to simulate findings from offenders while they 
were on parole. Thus we could determine their inherent risk separate from type of supervision. See Julie 
Gerlinger & Susan Turner, California’s Public Safety Realignment: Correctional Policy Based on Stakes Rather 
than Risk, 26 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 805 (2015). 
91. Id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. Id.; see also Turner, supra note 70. 
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and non-violent property and drug crimes to misdemeanors. The Act was part of 
California’s continuing effort to reduce the prison population to be in compliance 
with a three-judge court order requiring CDCR to reduce the prison population to 
137.5% of capacity.98 
The proposition also allowed offenders previously convicted of felonies (who 
were currently serving time or were on probation for felony convictions) and 
offenders who had completed probation terms to petition the court for 
reclassification of their offenses to misdemeanors. State savings from the reduction 
of these crimes would be spent on mental health and substance, truancy, and  
drop-out prevention.99 Funds from Proposition 47 have yet to be distributed to 
counties for education and services, however, findings are being generated on the 
impact of Proposition 47. As predicted, the population at the CDCR fell after 
Proposition 47. From October 2014 to October 2015, the state prison population 
dropped from 127,378 to 122,342 (in-state).100 Analyses by the PPIC estimated that 
there was an overall decline of 9 % in the jail population, driven by a reduction in 
persons serving or being held for Proposition 47 offenses.101 Although definitive 
data are not available regarding the relationship between Proposition 47 and crime, 
critics maintain that recently-observed increases in violent and property crime are 
the direct result of Proposition 47. For example, according to the San Francisco 
Chronicle, San Francisco led the nation in the highest increase in property crimes 
from 2014 to 2015 (using data from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform 
Crime Reporting program).102 The Los Angeles Sheriff, along with other law 
enforcement officials, maintains that “Proposition 47 has led to more crime while 
forcing fewer addicts into treatment.”103 Although it is difficult to parse the true 
effects of Proposition 47, given that other causes may be operating, critics believe 
that without offenders having the “stick” of the justice system to force them into 
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treatment, offenders will be free to commit crime. An often-cited anecdote is that 
offenders go into stores with a calculator to determine whether they have shoplifted 
under $950, knowing that they will only be arrested for a misdemeanor if they keep 
the amount of property stolen below this value.104 Important to the argument 
regarding offense-based sentencing under Proposition 47 is that, once again, public 
safety policy was developed without consideration of offender risk to recidivate, 
and instead relied on the offense committed by an offender. Proposition 47 targets 
many of the same group of “low level” offenders under Realignment—a group we 
estimated had higher recidivism rates than serious/violent parolees. 
C. Newly Passed Proposition 57 Proposes Early Release for Non-Violent Offenders 
In 2016, another proposition was placed on the California ballot, in the 
continuing effort to bring the prison population under 137.5% design capacity, 
although the Proposition was not directly marketed to voters as such. “The 
California Parole for Non-Violent Criminals and Juvenile Court Trial Requirements 
Initiative” was a combined initiated constitutional amendment and state statute.105 
Certain prison inmates convicted of nonviolent offenses will be eligible for early 
release, if awarded additional sentencing credits for good behavior and approved 
educational or rehabilitative accomplishments.106 Estimates were that 25,000 
inmates were potentially eligible for early release and parole.107 This is the first time 
the term “early release” has been used to describe state efforts to reduce the prison 
population in the mix of recent policies. One of the arguments in favor of the 
proposition was that Proposition 57 would keep “dangerous criminals behind bars, 
while rehabilitating juvenile and adult inmates and saving tens of millions of 
taxpayer dollars.”108 Arguments against Proposition 57 included that the 
Proposition would allow inmates convicted of a number of violent offenses to be 
released early, endangering public safety. The vast majority of county district 
attorneys across the state were against the Proposition, arguing that there is no state 
definition of non-violent offense; any offense that is not designated as violent under 
California Penal Code Section 667.5c would be considered non-violent. According 
to opponents, this would lead the way for a number of violent crimes not under the 
 
104. Eli Saslow, A ‘Virtual Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card’: A New California Law to Reduce Prison 
Crowding Keeps One Addict out of Jail, But Not out of Trouble, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2015),  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/10/10/prop47/ [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180311141357/http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/10/10/prop47/?utm_term= 
.0f34a1136cf5]. 
105. Cal. Sec’y of State, Proposition 57, CAL. GEN. ELECTION: NOV. 8,  
2016, http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/en/propositions/57/ [https://web.archive.org/web/ 
20180209222727/http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/en/propositions/57/] ( last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
106. Id. 
107. California Proposition 57, Parole for Non-Violent Criminals and Juvenile Court Trial 
Requirements (2016), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_57,_Parole_for_ 
Non-Violent_Criminals_and_Juvenile_Court_Trial_Requirements_(2016) [https://perma.cc/5P3C-
DAYV] ( last visited Mar. 18, 2018) [hereinafter California Proposition 57 ]. 
108. Cal. Sec’y of State, supra note 105. 
Final to Printer_Turner (2) (Do Not Delete) 6/3/2018  2:07 PM 
2018]     MOVING FROM AN OFFENSE- TO RISK-BASED SYSTEM 117 
penal code to be eligible for early release.109 The ballot measure passed with 63.6% 
of the voters in favor.110 
IV. USE OF “RISK” FACES CHALLENGES IN CALIFORNIA 
As California has moved to reduce its reliance on incarceration, strongly 
motivated by the three-judge court order to reduce its prison, key policy changes 
have centered on the offenses committed by offenders. The movement has 
generally been articulated as removing lower level offenders from prison (or moving 
offenses from felonies to misdemeanors) and keeping the higher-level offenders at 
the state level—either in prison or on parole. The assumption is that these “lower 
level” offenders – defined by offense are the least serious. In essence, “lower level” 
has been conflated with lower risk in public discussions. As shown by the analysis 
of the proxy groups, this assumption is not necessarily correct. Analysis of simulated 
cohorts under PRCS and parole showed that PRCS offenders actually had higher 
rates of recidivism than parole.111 This may also explain a common observation 
made by probation staff regarding realigned offenders in a recent RAND evaluation 
of twelve counties’ experiences under Realignment. Probation representatives 
“consistently reported risk levels for PRCS and mandatory-supervision (MS) cases 
as higher than those for routine felony offenders.”112 
Using offense as the primary determinant in sentences and policies reflects 
sentencing aims of proportionality or “just desserts.” However, using offense-type 
as proxies for future criminal behavior is also problematic based on research relating 
to offender specialization. Although there is some evidence that offenders may 
specialize in the types of offense, a substantial portion may engage in a wide variety 
of criminal behaviors. The groundbreaking RAND study of over 2,000 male prison 
and jail inmates in three states identified a number of different offender typologies, 
based on self-reported crimes and combinations of crimes committed.113 The most 
serious group of offenders—those who committed robbery, assault and drug deals 
at high rates (and also often committed burglaries, thefts and other property crimes 
at high rates)—could not be identified by official arrest and conviction records 
alone.114 
Using “offense” as the primary driver in recent policies has been problematic 
for different reasons on at least two of the policies discussed in this article. The 
California Penal Code defines serious and violent offenses under PC1192.7(c)115 
and PC 667.5.116 In both Realignment and Proposition 57, we see the desire to 
augment serious and violent offenses beyond those specified in the penal code. For 
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example, with Realignment, seventy additional codes were included in the definition 
of serious and violent.117 As noted above, for Proposition 57, District Attorneys are 
concerned that there is no definition of non-violent offenses, making offenses 
which on their surface appear to be “violent” eligible for consideration as 
nonviolent because they are not in the penal code. 
Additionally, the use of risk will require, at least at the state level, continued 
efforts to change the culture and educate policymakers. As shown by experiences 
with the PVDMI, parole agents did not think the tool included all the information 
that they themselves had and felt was important to use.118 Agents felt their clinical 
experience should outweigh an actuarial tool, despite evidence supporting the 
relatively poorer performance of pure clinical assessment relative to actuarial 
tools.119 Although the Risk-Needs-Responsivity approach to offender supervision 
has been garnering a lot of support across the country over the past twenty years, 
particularly in the corrections community, changing the mindset of CDCR staff 
requires effort.120 Recent efforts to reform California’s parole model are underway, 
with new approaches such as the California Parole Supervision and Integration 
Model (CPSRM), designed to bring evidence-based practices into common use. An 
outcome evaluation showed that despite agents exhibiting some behaviors 
consistent with evidence-based supervision, parole outcomes did not differ between 
treatment groups and comparison groups.121 Part of the resistance to reform may 
be related to technology transfer, an issue that has been noted by Taxman and 
Belenko.122 
Whether California should move to a more risk-based system is an open 
question. The CSRA risk tool is used by the CDCR in a number of operational 
decisions—programming prioritization, for example. In practice, the Department 
uses the risk score in conjunction with other information to make decisions—it 
does not make decisions based on the CSRA score alone. However, California has 
not been using risk in major reforms to reduce the prison population. Offense type 
remains the primary factor. However, risk assessment has garnered increased 
attention in the actual sentencing decision, but there are critics who point to a 
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number of concerns in the use of risk assessment, particularly at the sentencing 
stage.123 Former Attorney General Eric Holder criticized the use of risk instruments 
in sentencing and critics have called the effort misguided and possibly 
unconstitutional.124 
Even with the number of major corrections policy initiatives implemented 
recently (e.g., transferring responsibility of “lower level” offenders to the counties, 
reducing returns to prison for parole violations, sentencing credits), California’s  
in-state prison population remains over 124,600.125 The state continues to struggle 
to meet three-judge panel targets. Elsewhere across the county, states are utilizing 
similar strategies, many of which have not seen major reductions in their prison 
populations. A review of the experiences of the thirty-one states participating in the 
PEW Reinvestment Initiative126 shows the variety of responses being used around 
the country that mirror what California is trying. However, focusing on lower level 
property and drug offenses is probably not sufficient, as prisons contain high 
percentages of serious and violent offenders. Some observers are calling for more 
drastic measures—such as wholesale sentencing reform—as the only way to 
successfully reduce the incarceration population.127 In the short term, California 
policymakers should be more straightforward in discussions about crime policies 
based on offense. Lower level offenses do not necessarily translate into lower level 
risk to the public. 
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